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2. 
hand argue that the informal sector is subordinated to the to the formal 
sector via direct links which enables the formal sector to extract surplus 
from the informal sector (Le Brun and Gerry, 1975; Moser, 1976; Tokman, 1978). 
Towards an integrated theory. Too often it is assumed that in adopting a 
certain paradigm, one automatically excludes the insights offered by rival 
interpretations. 'Informal sector' debates are unfortunately no exception, 
and thus an integrated theoretical approach could be useful. Before such an 
approach can be developed however, it is necessary to combine the observations 
of the "marginality" and "petty commodity producer" theories. This is best 
done by means of a diagram. 
Figure 1. Locating the informal sector. 
The above figure consists of three adjacent triangles representing the indus-
trial reserve army, the marginal pole, and the formal sector of the economy. 
3. 
A circle overlapping the apex of all three triangles comprises the informal 
sector. 
The industrial reserve army triangle consists of those people who could get a 
job in the formal sector if some expansion took place. Given the large labour 
surplus in Third World cities, these people would need to have some formal 
sector skills or experience which could get them jobs in the future. The 
industrial reserve army has two sub-components. Sub-part 'a' consists of 
those people who are full-time job-seekers, perhaps living off savings and 
borrowing from friends and relatives. As these people are not productively 
engaged, they are not part of the informal sector and are thus excluded from 
the inner circle of the diagram. 
The second sub-cornponent, part 'b
1
, consists of those people who although they 
could theoretically could obtain work in the formal sector, have ceased their 
job search and gone into the informal sector as a 'temporary' measure. They 
plan to leave it as soon as formal sector jobs became available. They have, 
in other words adopted a "fall-back" strategy which as Wilkinson and Webster 
point out, "becomes a necessary substitute for the social security benefits 
that the state has failed to provide" (1982: 8). 
The marginal pole triangle represents people outside the formal sector and the 
industrial reserve army - those truly peripheral to the industrial economy. 
Having rio formal sector skills or experience, they have little hope of ever 
being employed in the formal sector. Part 'd' of this triangle comprises 
those working in the informal sector for a living. They are likely to be on 
the lower rungs of the informal sector, ie to be the most poorly paid wage 
workers due to their lack of formal training. Part 'e' consists of the 
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"dregs" within the marginal pole - the truly marginalised people who are not 
even active in informal production. Such unfortunates would include beggars 
(Ruizz-Perez, 1979) and garbage pickers (Birbeck, 1979). 
Finally, the formal sector triangle comprises those working in the formal 
sector full-time (sub-part 'f') and those who, whilst occupying jobs in the 
formal sector, also supplement their incomes with informal productive activity 
(part 'c'). 
In short, this approach argues that only some part of the marginal pole fits 
into the informal sector, that the industrial reserve army may or may not 
participate in informal activities, and that people who are not marginalised 
can also form part of the informal sector. 
The diagram has further implications. For instance, groups 'c',
 1
 b
1
 and 'd' 
probably represent different income hierarchies in the informal sector. The 
members from the marginal pole (i.e.
 1
 d
1
) are likely to be the worst off as 
they have no formal sector skills or experience. That part of the industrial 
reserve army operating in the the informal sector (i.e. 'b
1
) will probably 
occupy the next niche in the income hierarchy. Its members will have some 
'human capital', and possibly past savings of their own. Having two income 
sources, those employed in both the formal sector and informal sectors (ie 
group 'c') are probably well off on average, although some individual members 
from group • b' could do better. 
Thus far we have uncritically accepted the categories "formal" and "informal 
sector". In terms of the diagram, the informal sector has been conceived as 
comprising of a large number petty enterprises manned by people from within 
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the industrial reserve army, the marginal pole, and by some of those who also 
hold jobs in the forma! sector. The informal sector as a concept has thus 
been conflated with that of petty enterprise. 
Within Marxian theory, subordinated petty enterprise as a concept covers a 
wide range of productive concerns. This is mainly due to the fact that its 
ambit has never been defined in terms of characteristics, but always in terms 
of its structural position. For example it is often defined by obscure vagar-
ies such as "never having constituted the dominant or total production of a 
society but ... always ... articulated within another wider social formation" 
(Moser, 1978: 1057), and as a "form of production existing at the margins of 
the capitalist mode of production but nevertheless integrated into it and 
subordinated to it" (Le Brun and Gerry, 1975: 20). 
The weakness of the subordinated petty enterprise theory in its approach to 
the informal sector is simply that it includes far too much. It includes all 
those enterprises which have to operate in an environment dominated by a large 
scale (often transnational) capitalist sector which basically "calls the tune" 
when it comes to supplies, prices, wages, market conditions, etc. Consequently 
a legal storekeeper with two or three cafes would be classified as informal 
along with a poverty-stricken hawker. As this broadens the definition of the 
informal sector towards the absurd, it is necessary to isolate the informal 
sector as a concept apart from the broader category of petty enterprise.^ 
2. Davies makes precisely this point: "a distinction should be made between 
those working in informal employment primarily to accumulate money for re-
investment and those who work in the Informal Sector out of necessity. In the 
latter case the sector provides an indispensible means of subsistence. In 
other words, some informal operators may be legitimately regarded as small 
scale capitalist producers while others may not" (Davies 1978. 23). 
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In most cases the informal sector has been described as consisting of all 
those people outside formal wage employment in the large-scale officially 
recognised and regulated sector, as well as all enterprises which function 
outside government rules and regulations and which operate on a small scale 
using labour intensive technology.^ Obviously the informal sector enterprise 
does not have to show all three characteristics simultaneously in order to 
qualify. Similarly, exhibiting only one characteristic would not be suffic-
ient. Consequently, as a general rule, one should argue that an informal 
sector enterprise must manifest at least two of these three characteristics. 
This is shown diagramatically below. 
Figure 2. Characteristics of the informal sector. 
3. Obviously the terms "small scale" and "labour intensive" are extremely 
vague in this context. This however is unavoidable because to place limits 
on the capital:output ratio and number of employees allowed would be so arbit-
rary as to be useless. Rather the terms "small-scale" and "labour-intensive" 
shall be used as principles of classification. Their exact magnitudes would 
vary from case to case depending on the scale and capital intensity of the 
formal sector. 
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Figure Two is a Venn diagram consisting of three category sets; labour inten-
sive, officially recognised and unregulated, and small-scale. Most informal 
enterprises are likely to fall into group 'a' - ie will be officially unrecog-
nised and unregulated, small-scale and labour-intensive. However, it is 
possible to find a small-scale labour-intensive petty producer who also has a 
licence - eg. a patent medicine man. Although legal, such a business should 
fall into the Informal sector and be represented by area 'b
1
. 
Very few enterprises are likely to fall into group "c" which consists of large 
scale, labour intensive and officially unrecognised and unregulated enter-
prises. It stands to reason that there is a playoff between expanding produc-
tion and operating outside the sphere of official recognition and regulation. 
Being illegal restricts accumulative possibilities as police, inspectors etc. 
have to be bribed or dodged and enterprises located in the "seamy" parts of 
town in order to avoid official attention. Consequently, large-scale expand-
ing enterprises will tend to opt for official recognition - and hence move out 
of the informal sector. 
Also, with official recognition comes additional costs, many associated with 
labour, such as medical schemes, compulsory compensation, registration etc. 
Consequently, the large officially recognised firms would tend towards capital 
intensity. The only group that really fits into the large-scale, labour-
intensive officially unrecognised sector is organised crime! 
As regards position "d", ie officially unrecognised small-scale and capital-
intensive - one is also likely to find few enterprises. Small-scale enter-
prises are unlikely to be both capital-intensive and officially unrecognised 
as an entrepeneur with enough money to buy machinery is likely to choose to 
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comply with official regulations as it gives him or her broader scope for 
accumulation. Positions "c" and "d" thus both refer to few enterprises and 
those that fall within them (apart from organised crime ) are likely to be 
transitional - on their way out of the sector. 
In brief then, the informal sector operator, having limited access to and 
control of capital, will be labour-intensive, small-scale and likely to oper-
ate outside of official recognition due to licencing costs and because his or 
her standards of production are lower than those officially demanded. How-
ever, if the standards are low, and the costs of the licence reasonable, it is 
likely that the petty operator will work within the sphere of official recog-
nition. 
The economic implications of the integrated approach. It is clear that the 
informal sector is far from homogeneous, incorporating many activities perfor-
med under different conditions. Consequently it would be trite to state that 
the informal sector either can or cannot experience evolutionary growth, as 
the degree to which the different operators will be exploited by formal capi-
tal depends on the market conditions facing them. 
Market conditions. The major contribution of the marxist approach is its 
focus on the ability of the large-scale capitalist (formal) sector to exploit 
the informal sector via its control over market conditions. This includes 
formal sector controls over informal sector supply (materials, machinery 
maintenance) and output (eg subcontracting arrangements). On a general level, 
the point is often made that because the informal sector lacks access to 
credit, it is forced to buy from retailers rather than wholesalers. This 
means additional profits for the formal sector and losses to the informal 
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sector with the consequence of poor growth prospects for the latter (Gerry, 
1978; Moser, 1978). 
However, despite the grimness of the above picture, informal sector enter-
prises have been known to generate surpluses even under hostile conditions. 
In Nairobi for example, informal sector enterprises have been reported to have 
multiplied their capital by as much as six to ten times over an average of 
five years (Sethuraman, 1981: 35). These cases show that under certain condit-
ions the Informal sector can generate a surplus and hence grow. 
The great question is then - what are these conditions? Perhaps the way to 
approach this is to ask the opposite question - eg what areas should the 
informal sector avoid? The first is obviously that of direct competition with 
the formal sector for markets flooded with mass-produced goods. Not having 
scale advantages, credit, high technology, sophisticated machinery etc, the 
informal sector cannot hope to compete. 
Although frequently advocated by policymakers, the second dangerous area is 
subcontracting with the formal sector for the supply of intermediary goods. 
While subcontracting guarantees the informal sector a market and a fixed 
income, it also has some disconcerting drawbacks. In the first place, it is 
the formal sector that is the winner in the subcontracting game, not the 
informal sector. Using decentralised production methods reduces the need for 
fixed capital and is particularly useful when the demand for final products 
is temporary or fluctuating. Also, by using the "out-work" subcontracting 
system, workers can be "laid off" with no comebacks or cost (Roberts, 1978: 
117). Furthermore, the informal sector runs the risk of the formal sector 
deciding to produce the goods itself, or to break the production process down 
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even further, and paying proportionately lower prices for the sub-contracted 
articles. One must of course be careful of generalising about all subcon-
tracting arrangements. In certain areas room for bargaining may exist. 
Nevertheless, subcontracting should be viewed with suspicion. 
Areas in which the informal sector can prosper are those not considered by the 
formal sector. These are the "unprofitable" areas of the economy and the 
illegal market. The illegal market includes the sale of narcotics, home brew 
and sexual favours. In a sense, informal operators have cornered the illegal 
market - although the risks are often high enough to push them out of it. 
There is also room for informal activity in areas deemed unprofitable by the 
formal sector. For instance, the formal sector may not see any profit in 
travelling out to peri-urban areas or squatter camps to provide goods. A 
local informal sector consequently has a locational advantage and as long as 
its prices remain below those of the out-town formal sector plus transport 
costs, it will have a market. Other areas disregarded by the formal sector 
are small scale peripheral activities like shoe-shining, street-singing etc. 
Another potential area is that of the so-called "poor" market, ie catering 
specifically for low-income people. Here the emphasis would be on the use of 
cheap (if not waste) materials to keep production costs low, and on the sale 
of very small quantities at a time. There is also a demand from low income 
people for specialised goods such as braziers, repairs, and the supply of 
second-hand clothes. 
Perhaps serving the needs of the poor market is the best option for the 
informal sector. As Sandbrook maintains, "it is a reasonable proposition that 
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large firms cannot, displace petty producers from markets restricted to the 
poor alone" (Sandbrook, 1982: 160). 
However, this may not continue to be the case in the long run. If it becomes 
clear for example, that cheap burners are selling well, the formal sector may 
step in and take over. This is the phenomenon Bienefeld calls the "growth 
destruction impasse." He agrees that once the market served by petty commod-
ity producers goes beyond a certain size, the formal sector will invest there 
and capture the market by virtue of its technological efficiency. This imp-
lies that petty enterprise is residual up to a point - ie is allowed to 
operate only in the "nooks and crannies" of the economy deemed unprofitable by 
large capitalist enterprises (Bienefeld, 1975). 
The other possible implication is that the informal sector will in the "last 
instance" become either formalised or atomised into wage workers. However, as 
the lonely hour of the last instance remains far away, many more generations 
of informal sector operators should be able to make a living out of these 
economic nooks and crannies. 
STREET TRADING IN TRANSKEI - A CASE STUDY 
Transkei's street traders are typical of the lower echelons of the informal 
sector. They are poor, marginalised and at the bottom of the socio-economic 
ladder. The data below was obtained from a survey conducted in 1982 covering 
13 out of Transkei's 28 towns. 571 street traders were enumerated and 137 
interviewed. The wide variety of activities found among the street traders and 
the occupational distribution of men and women is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Occupational distribution of men and women. 
Sample Census-*-
Occupation 
Male 
Number % 
Female 
Number % 
Total 
Number % 
Total 
Number % 
Fruit and vegetables 3 18 65 54 68 50 326 57 
Clothing 2 12 27 22 29 21 74 13 
Cobbler 5 29 0 0 5 4 17 3 
Herbalist 3 18 0 0 3 2 17 3 
Chicken, meat & fish 0 0 7 6 7 5 34 6 
Combinations of goods'' 0 0 15 13 15 11 80 14 
Other 4 24 6 5 5 7 23 4 
Total 17 100 120 100 137 100 571 100 
1) The sex and occupational distribution of the hawker census shows how the 
original sample (137 cases) was biased away from fruit and vegetable sellers 
and towards producers like the clothing sellers. In order to rectify the 
bias, cases were randomly removed from each category until the percentage 
distribution of the sample equaled the that of the census. This left 100 
cases. Unless otherwise specified, all data in this section originates from 
this stratified sample. 
2) Those selling combinations of goods always sold either fruit or vegetables 
along with another line such as knitted hats. In other words, they both 
produced and speculated in fruit and vegetables at the same time. 
The dominance of women. The most striking aspect of the sample was that 88% 
of the respondents were female.^ This is not surprising when one considers 
that women are largely excluded from the South African labour market, and that 
relatively few jobs are open to women within Transkei. For instance, in 1975, 
70% of paid jobs in Transkei were occupied by men (Rep. of Transkei, 1978: 7). 
4. Other studies done in Africa have found a similar concentration of women in 
the informal sector. According to Heyzer, Ghanaian women constitute 80% of 
the total labour force engaged in trade. She also points out that 80% of 
market vendors in Lusaka are women. (Heyzer, 1981: 10) 
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One could argue that because women have husbands, fathers, lovers, etc, and 
therefore have access to income and produce off the land, there is no need for 
them to engage in street trading and thus they do it only to supplement the 
household income. However, the survey showed that 86% of the street traders 
had no other income earners in their household and that on averaqe thev had 
4.3 children to feed. In other words it is only the meaqre proceeds from 
hawking that stand between their families and starvation. 
An interesting fact which emerged is that marital status was no indication of 
the existence of a supplementary income. For instance, 55% of the hawkers 
were married, and yet, as previously mentioned, 86% had no other sources of 
income. This reflects both the high unemployment rate amongst males in Tran-
skei and the substantial desertion rate of male miqrants from the area. 
Breakdown in terms of goods sold. As shown in Table 1, 57% of the sample sold 
only fruit and vegetables, while a further 14% supplemented their fruit anH 
vegetables with another small line such as chickens or knitted hats. In other 
words, 71% can he said to be petty traders who speculate rather than produce. 
The other 29% were producers such as dressmakers (13%), cobblers (3%), tradit-
ional medicine sellers (3%), and cooked meat sellers (5%). The remaininq 5% 
consisted of craftsmen such as bangle makers, beadsellers and decoration 
makers. 
Closely associated with the above breakdown is a sexual division of labour. 
Women dominated the unskilled (speculative) occupations, makinq up 96% of the 
fruit and vegetable sellers, while men featured strongly in the producinq 
sectors. Men made up 100% of the cobbling and traditional medicine trades and 
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dominated the craft sector.^ Apart from clothing, men dominated those occupat-
ions which required skilled labour of some sort. However, one must remember-
that both men and skilled occupations were a very small part of the sample. 
Age structures. A further differentiation between the male and female street 
traders is apparent regarding age structures. As Table 2 (below) shows, the 
female age structure is relatively normal apart from the above-average number 
in the 51-60 age category. In other words, the young and middle aged categor-
ies dominate the curve. 
Table 2. Age distribution of men and women. 
Sex 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71+ Total 
Male 0 2 5 2 3 4 1 17 
Female 3 24 34 21 22 9 3 116* 
Total 3 26 39 23 25 13 4 133 
1) The table is drawn from the original sample of 137 in order to get as many 
male cases as possible. During the stratification the male sub-sample was 
reduced from 17 to 12. Thus in order to get a more meaningful male age 
distribution, 137 cases rather than 100 were used for this table. 
*) 4 cases were missing from the female sub-sample. 
Concerning the male curve however, things are vastly different. One finds a 
peak occuring at the 21-30 year old age group and another at the 61-70 age 
group. Because the male sample consisted of only 17 cases, it is too small to 
5. This is corroborated by a Transkei rural study which showed that men 
dominate the shoe-repair, building and herbalist categories (Moll, 1984). 
Bromley found a similar trend in his Cali study. He points out that females 
tend to deal in food items and males in non-food items (Bromley, 1978: 1162). 
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producers had the resources to travel to large centres and buy in bulk while 
only 28% of the speculators could afford to do so. In other words, substan-
tial differences in profit margins exist between the producers and the specu-
lators. 
Indications of Marginalisation. So far we have produced no hard evidence that 
Transkei's street traders are marginalised. It is clear that they are worse 
off than the average urban family in Transkei. For instance, a Bureau for 
Market Research study done in 1979 found that only 62% of Transkei urban 
households had a sole income earner and that such an earner was usually male 
(BMR, 1980). In comparison, 86% of the street traders were sole income earn-
ers while 76% were female and the only income earners. 
However, being "worse off" does not necessarily imply that one is marginal-
ised. Marginalisation implies lack of access to alternative economic resour-
ces such as land or jobs. 
Access to land. Unfortunately no questions relating directly to the street 
traders' access to land were asked in the survey. However two questions did 
provide indirect indications of access to land. 
The first was the question, "Where were you born?". 59% replied that they 
were born in the town they were presently in. 38% replied that they were born 
in another town in Transkei, while only 3% replied that they had been born in 
a rural area. The second question, "Is your permanent home in this town - if 
not where is it?", correlates closely with the first. 72% replied that their 
home was in the town they were selling in, 25% replied that it was in another 
town nearby, and only 3% said it was in a rural area. 
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From the above data, it is clear the majority of the street traders were 
thoroughly urbanised, and for the most part at least second-generation urban 
dwellers. Movements that occurred from birthplace to their present home 
seemed to be movements from one town to another. The same applies as regards 
movements from home to selling place. Consequently it is unlikely that more 
than 3% of the street traders had any access to land. 
Access to jobs. To find out whether the street traders in Transkei were in 
that occupation from choice or because they were unable to obtain formal 
sector jobs, two questions were asked: "Would you prefer a steady paying job 
- if so, why?", and "When was the last time you had a steady paying job - why 
did you lose it?" 
To the question, "Would you prefer a steady paying job?", only 44% said yes. 
One could interpret this as meaning that 56% of the street traders preferred 
their present occupation to wage employment. However, this conclusion is 
reversed when one tabulates job preference by the reasons given for such 
preference. 
Table 3. Work preference by reasons given. 
Reason for work preference (%) 
Work 
Preference 
More 
money 
More 
security 
Easier 
work 
Too old 
or sick 
Husband 
objects 
Care for 
children Total (N) 
Prefer job 88 12 0 0 0 0 100 (44) 
Prefer hawking 15 0 23 46 8 8 100 (56) 
Total 48 5 13 26 4 4 100 (100) 
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From Table 3 we can see that of the 44% who answered that they would prefer a 
steady job, 88% gave financial reasons, and the remaining '12% cited the secu-
rity of a set weekly/monthly income as the reason. These answers reflect the 
hazardous life of the street seller, both financially and in terms of police 
harassment. 
Of the 56% who claimed not to prefer a steady job, 47% justified it on the 
grounds that they were too old or sick to accept a steady paying job which, 
for most of them, would require a fair amount of manual labour. Similarly 23% 
argued that street trading was "easier" and thus preferable. The interviewers 
told me that the people who answered this were usually old or crippled. 
Consequently this answer too may be a measure of incapacity rather than lazi-
ness or simple preference. In short, it can be argued that 69% of those who 
answered 'no' to the question, "Would you prefer a steady paying job?", did so 
because of a physical incapacity of some sort. 
16% of those who answered that they would not prefer a steady job, did so for 
family reasons, ie they had to look after children or their husbands objected 
to them working. Here too the answer is determined by limitations rather than 
a strict preference. In fact, the only people who answered no as a direct 
matter of choice were the 15% (of those 56% who preferred hawking) who answer-
ed that money was better in the street trading business. In other words, it 
is "likely that only 8% of the total sample really preferred working in the 
street trading business and were not "forced" into it in some way or another. 
The most successful entrepreneurs I encountered who had entered the informal 
sector by choice, were two cobblers at the Butterworth busrank. They told me 
they left their jobs with a shoemaker in the formal sector because the wages 
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there were poor. According to their estimates, they are now making nearly 
three times their previous wage each month. ^  Nevertheless, the vast majority 
of the street traders were there because of physical or other limitations. In 
other words, they would fall into position •d• in Figure 1 except for the 
cobblers who would fall into area 'b
1
. 
The question about job preference revealed another interesting fact. The 
interviewers told the hawkers that the imaginary steady job paid R50 per 
month. This implies that informal sector incomes are for the vast majority, 
less than R50 per monthJ
0
 A further indication of low income is that 84% of 
the street traders saved nothing, and 13% saved R20 or less a month. 
Table 4. Last job held (year). 
Last year of formal employment percentage 
cumulative 
percentage 
Never had a job 26 26 
Last job held between 1939 - 1959 4 30 
Last job held between 1960 - 1970 16 46 
Last job held between 1971 - 1975 19 65 
Last job held between 1976 - 1978 17 82 
Last job held between 1979 - 1982 18 100 
Total 100 
9. One must bear in mind however, that earnings are relative. For instance, a 
woman in Mount Frere, told me that money was better in hawking because her 
previous job as a domestic paid R3 a month! 
10. No direct questions were asked about income to avoid suspicion and con-
fusions between profit and turnover. 
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The question "When was the last time you had a steady paying job and why did 
you lose it?" revealed further indications of marginalisation. From Table 4, 
we can see that 26% of the street traders had never had formal jobs. Being so 
totally inexperienced, their chances of ever getting formally employed are 
almost zero, thus they can be regarded as marginalised. 54% of the street 
traders held jobs somewhere between 1971 and 1982 while 35% held jobs between 
1976 and 1982. These relatively new entrants illustrate the growing unemploy-
ment crisis in Transkei. 
When one considers the reasons given as to why the hawkers lost their previous 
jobs, some interesting facts emerge. 
Table 5. Reasons for leaving formal sector jobs. 
Reasons Percentages 
Fired 3 
Employer moved 12 
111 health 27 
Too little pay 36 
Old age 3 
Pregnancy 8 
Laid off 8 
Accident 2 
Endorsed out of South Africa 1 
Total 100 
From Table 5 it appears that 64% of those that had had jobs lost them for 
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Moreover, since August 1981, hawkers in Urntata have been prevented by law from 
staying in any one place for longer than five minutes. To keep moving is very 
tiring and few hawkers manage to obey the municipal ordinance. This has 
provided the police with additional reasons to arrest the hawkers and confis-
cate their wares.^ 
Official attidudes to street trading in Transkei. Bromley, in his study of 
Call, Columbia, found that the urban authorities "usually consider Street 
Traders to be a nuisance, making the city look untidy and ugly by their very 
presence, causing traffic congestion, dropping litter, molesting passersby, 
depriving the law abiding and paying shops of trade and spreading diseases by 
physical contact and the sale of contaminated or rotting food" (Bromley, 
1978.- 1163). 
Much the same attitudes are discernable amongst the various government repre-
sentatives in Umtata. For instance, it is argued that hawkers "cause obstruc-
tions on sidewalks and public places" (Sacke, 1982: 5), leave the place 
"littered with cardboard boxes, banana peels, etc" (Mtshizana, 1982: 1), "de-
file semi-sacred objects like war memorials and generally create an eyesore in 
the city" (Sacke, 1982: 5). These factors are held to be a danger to the 
tourist industry. For example, an Umtata magistrate argues, "... there is 
the effect on tourism, which is one of the greatest money spinners this 
country has. People going in coaches around here are very loathe to see 
ladies with boxes in piles of skins" (Houston Barnes, 1982: 2). 
12. The increase in police harassment has been accompanied by tougher penal-
ties imposed on hawkers by magistrates. For example, in April 1982 a hawker 
was sentenced to two months' imprisonment without the option of a fine. Pre-
viously the penalty had been a RIO or a R20 fine. (Golden City Press, 
14/11/82) 
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The health issue has also been raised. The city health inspector has pointed 
out that fruit and vegetable hawkers often wash their wares in stormwater 
drains whose water may be contaminated with industrial effluence. (Mtshizana, 
1982:2). The problems of hygiene were drawn further by a Cabinet Minister, 
who claimed that hawkers could bring cholera to Umtata and spread it around 
the city (Letlaka, 1982). 
An often cited complaint against the street traders is that they worry motor-
ists arid pedestrians in their efforts to sell their goods. According to the 
town clerk, by creating such disturbances the street traders "indirectly at 
least contribute to an increase in crimes such as bag snatching, etc" (Sacke, 
1982: 5). 
In short, the local government in Umtata upholds the belief that street trad-
ers are a messy, unhygienic, crime-inducing nuisance in the city. These 
attitudes are accompanied by large-scale police harassment of hawkers selling 
in the central business district. 
The Role of Formal Sector Interests. One way to approach such a perspective 
would be to attack it as being too "westernized." This argument has been 
adopted by an Umtata researcher who maintains that "local government officials 
delude themselves that they are living in a western environment and .... try 
to enforce standards that are very exclusive and not in line with the pre-
vailing economic realities" (C. Tapscott, quoted in Golden City Press, 
14/11/82: 8). 
Such a strategy aims at "Africanising" existing legislation by revising it 
downwards until suited to the needs of a developing country and assumes that 
25. 
existing legislation is there "by mistake" in the sense that it was adopted 
without the necessary considerations being made. This implies that if one 
provides the local government with enough clear and well thought-out argu-
ments, legislation suitable to the needs of a Third World African country will 
be adopted. 
Unfortunately, legislation is not made in the sphere of ideology alone. There 
are other underlying (determinant?) reasons for this ordinance and these are 
the interests of, and pressures from, formal sector businesses. In the words 
of the town clerk, "any municipal council is under pressure to, and generally 
does act in accordance with, the best interests of the electorate who are rate 
payers. The formal sector of commerce and industry are rate payers, and 
usually big rate payers at that. They often contribute the greater part of 
the municipal income. The informal sector, the hawker, on the other hand, are 
seldom ratepayers and seldom make contributions" (Sacke, 1982: 3). 
Sacke points out that whereas the formal sector has to pay high license fees, 
rates and comply with regulations, the hawker can simply set him or herself up 
on the sidewalk with none of this expense. This, he says, is "unfair com-
petition". Therefore, he concludes, "the council has a responsibility to this 
group, the formal trader suffering from unfair competition and is often sub-
jected to pressure from them" (Sacke, 1982: 5). Consequently, it has been the 
councils' policy to eliminate, or more recently restrict, hawking in the 
greater part of the city, "especially in the central business area"
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 (Sacke, 
13. Bromley, in his study of Call, Columbia, found similar instances of big 
businesses complaining of 'disloyal competition'. Similarly, he points out 
that authorities 'defend' the more prestigious areas of the city from large 
scale invasion by street traders, forcing many street traders into poorer and 
less central areas" (Bromley, 1978: 1164). 
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1982; 6). In other words, 1t appears that pressure from the big profit makers 
in Umtata pushes the council into harassing the hawkers, rather than some 
"city beautiful" ideal. 
One must of course avoid falling into the trap of postulating a direct antag-
onism between the formal sector and the hawkers. The formal sector as such, 
is by no means united by a common interest against the street traders. In 
fact, the actions and opinions of certain businesspeople in Umtata indicate 
that the formal sector is characterised by two widely opposing positions on 
street traders. 
Street Traders Wersus Big Businesses. According to the manager of an Umtata 
store which, judging its prices and contents, caters specifically for the 
Umtata elite, hawkers are " filthy ... people - unhygienic - selling dirty 
fruit and vegetables to the public!" When asked for more specifics, he 
claimed that the hawkers dirtied "his" pavement and blocked the window display 
and entrance to the store. Almost as an after-thought he added, "and besides, 
they are competition for us. They sit outside and sell more cheaply". He was 
quick to call the police when hawkers appeared and had even driven them away 
himself. 
On the other hand, the proprietor of another large supplier in Umtata, (sup-
plier B), was a lot more tolerant towards the hawkers. His biggest complaint 
was that the hawkers bought potatoes from him, washed them in the stormwater 
drains and then sold them. He said this made the potatoes look more attractive 
when actually they were a lot less clean! lie had never called the police, but 
had threatened to do so a few times - "just for effect". 
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It appeared that the degree of formal sector antagonism towards the hawkers 
was inversely proportional to the amount of trade with them. No hawkers 
bought their wares from the elite store as in their opinion the selection was 
bad and the prices exorbitant. Supplier B on the other hand, because he had 
a fair amount of trade with hawkers, was prepared to adopt a more or less 
live-and-let-live approach towards them. 
Street traders and small formal businesses. During December 1982 a survey of 
Umtata hawkers was conducted asking only one question: "Where do you buy your 
wares?" All thirty-one of the hawkers questioned gave three to five names. 
All listed Majuju Cafe and roughly 80% listed Transkei Bazaar and Umtata 
Fisheries, About 40% mentioned Supplier B and none listed the elite store. 
Most of the hawkers, however, stressed that they bought where the goods were 
cheapest - so the popularity of the various low-priced shops would ebb and 
flow with their prices.^ 
The favoured shops were all relatively small businesses - tearoom size - and 
the owners adopted sympathetic positions towards the hawkers. The most en-
lightening interview came from the owner of the most popular supply shop -
Majuju cafe. He said that 90% of his trade was with hawkers and estimated his 
daily turnover from hawkers to be in the region of R3 500! He believed it was 
14. This economic rationality is illustrated by the following description by a 
hawker of her buying patterns: " I left home at 2 am this morning and took 
the bus to town. I bought bananas at Majuju cafe for R9,50 per box of about 
170 bananas. I then went to Lounge tearoom but the apples at R4,90 a box were 
not good quality. I then went to Transkei Bazaar and bought a bag of onions 
for R4,95. I was told that tomatoes were good at York Road Butchery and 
bought pio cases for R3,30 each I sent my friend's daughter to buy 
plastics for one cent each. I began packaging my goods before selling them" 
(quoted in an interview conducted by R Kingwell and A Morel, August 1982). 
* Plastic bags. 
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vegetables, etc which then get sold within the elite supermarkets' "beat", the 
1 fi 
smaller capitalists are in fact encroaching upon the big suppliers' market.
0 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that street traders in Transkei are mainly poor, margin-
alised people attempting to eke out a living for their families through hawk-
ing. Although hawking is often a stategy born of desperation, the municipal 
police all over Transkei harass the street traders by confiscating their 
goods, fining them, and even "imprisoning them. As the Umtata case study 
shows, the interests of big business, articulated through the City Councils, 
are often at the heart of this repression. 
Judging by unemployment trends in Transkei (Thomas, 1982), increasingly many 
people are likely to respond to the escalating employment crisis by swelling 
the ranks of the informal sector. This in turn means an increase in the scale 
of conflict between the police and the street traders. 
16, This has interesting implications as regards the "conservation-dissolu-
tion debate where it is argued that the informal sector is functional to the 
formal sector via the social security role it plays, its' production of cheap 
commodities for the poor and hence depressive effect on wages (Sandbrook, 
1982), and the "value transfers which take place through backward and forward 
linkages between petty producers and capital in the sphere of exchange" (Wil-
kinson and Webster, 1982: 4). These theorists tend to conclude that the 
dominant capitalist sector has a strategy of keeping the the informal sector 
at an "optimal size" - not to big to provide too much competition, and not too 
small to offer none of the advantages (Davies, 1979: 82; Dewar and Watson, 
1982: 138). 
The Llmtata study indicates that this "strategy" is by no means universally 
adopted by capital. Functional explanations such as this tend to point to 
phenomena which benefit capital "in general", in the long run. However, this 
does not mean that individual capitals will respond in accordance with these 
interests. They will respond to the immediate benefits or disadvantages the 
informal sector poses them as individual
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Transkei officials are going to have to re-evaluate their policy towards the 
street traders. If they continue to harass the street traders they will 
either be wasting their time and street trading will continue (as it is doing 
at the moment), or if they succeed in preventing the marginalised poor from 
hawking, it is likely they will turn to crime in order to survive. 
What options are available to the government? It could expand its present 
policies of aiding and "formalising" the informal sector. These policies 
adopted by TRANSIDO, (Transkei Small Industries Development Organisation) are 
geared towards helping small "entrepeneurs" become successful businesspeople. 
The ideology behind such schemes is articulated by Cabinet Minister Letlaka: 
"It is a well known fact that many a successful businessman in the world today 
started from a small beginning and, in a young country like Transkei, it it 
felt that every possible incentive should be provided to enable citizens who 
display the necessary initiative and courage to enter the field of commerce in 
however limited a manner, to prove themselves for who knows, they may be the 
giants of tomorrow's economy" (1982: 7). 
The study has shown that the assumptions iri the above quotation are very 
misleading. Firstly, it is clear that street traders enter the field of 
commerce not out of courage or initiative, but out of a need to survive. 
Secondly, the quotation implies that the success or failure of the street 
traders depends on whether they can "prove" themselves or not. This "everyone 
can make it big" ideology is incongruous when refering to Transkei's poverty 
stricken street traders. Likewise, the idea that street traders could become 
the giants of tomorrow's economy is equally absurd. One might find the odd 
trader becoming lucratively formalised, but this is certain to be very much 
the exception to the rule. 
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who could only afford one at a time. Such people do not frequent shops 
displaying expensive trinkets in the window! They would be more likely to buy 
from a street trader. 
By moving into a little shop Bernard raised his overhead costs, lost his 
lower-income market, and because the shop was close to the busrank, failed to 
capture a middle class clientele. /This case points to two problems with 
policies geared at promoting or formalising informal sector businesses. 
Firstly, promotional schemes could result in the informal operator being 
trapped between two markets and losing both. Secondly, even if a great deal 
of money is pumped into the informal sector, very few would formalise success-
fully. Skills are in too short a supply and the middle and upper-class 
markets are too small and already catered for to allow many new entrants. In 
other words, as a general policy, promoting Transkei street traders in this 
way is not an adequate solution. 
By the same token, limited institutionalisation is also problematic. As 
Watson points out, "street selling abounds because this is generally the 
optimal location for sellers and the most convenient for customers. In cases 
where an attempt has been made to force sellers off the streets and into newly 
constructed markets, the number of sellers has been greatly reduced and only 
the bigger, richer operators have been able to survive". She argues that the 
provision of facilities will make a positive contribution only if it is viewed 
as a social service (V. Watson, quoted in Wellings and Sutcliffe, 1984: 18). 
The other alternative is to let the informal sector proliferate and place no 
restrictions on it. Let the poor make a living as best they can. Possibly 
34. 
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